Now or Then? The Temporal Aspects of Choice-of-Law Clauses
Several years ago, I published a paper that examined how U.S. courts interpret choice-of-law clauses. That paper contains a detailed discussion of the most common interpretive issues—whether the clause selects the tort laws of the chosen jurisdiction in addition to its contract laws, for example—that arise in litigation. There was, however, one important omission. The…
Continue ReadingSide-Stepping the Dismal Swamp: A Reply to Roosevelt
In a recent post, we sought to call attention to what we see as two issues with the way the draft Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws embraces a specific theory of choice of law called the “two-step” approach. First, we suggested that there is a disconnect between the “two-step” approach and the Restatement’s black…
Continue ReadingWhat the Restatement Actually Says: A Response to Brilmayer and Listwa
In a recent post, Lea Brilmayer and Dan Listwa argue that there is a contradiction in the draft Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws, for which I am the Reporter. They claim that the Restatement’s two-step model for choice of law is in fundamental conflict with its statement of blackletter rules, and they argue instead…
Continue ReadingA Theory-Less Restatement for Conflict of Laws
For the first time in over half a century, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) is drafting a new Restatement of Conflict of Laws. The world has changed a great deal since 1971 when the Restatement (Second) was published, growing far more interconnected—so the idea of a new Restatement, taking into account the last few decades…
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