Mexico’s Claims Against Gun Manufacturers Suffer a Personal Jurisdiction Setback
August 14, 2024
In 2021, Mexico sued seven U.S. gun manufacturers in federal district court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging that they design, market, and sell guns in ways that they know will arm Mexican drug cartels. As described in an earlier post, the First Circuit held that some of Mexico’s claims were not barred by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA). The defendants have asked the Supreme Court to review that decision.
In the meantime, six of the defendants renewed their motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. On August 7, 2024, the district court (Chief Judge F. Dennis Saylor) granted those motions, holding that the court lacked either general or specific jurisdiction over those defendants. This is a setback for Mexico, but not a defeat. First, the district court did not dismiss Mexico’s claims against Smith & Wesson, which was headquartered in Massachusetts when the complaint was filed. Second, Mexico’s claims against the other six defendants may be refiled in states where general jurisdiction exists.
Mexico’s Claims
Mexico has strict gun laws and issues fewer than 50 gun permits a year. Yet it has the third most gun-related deaths in the world. It is estimated that more than half a million guns flow from the United States into Mexico each year. In recent years, nearly half the guns recovered from crime scenes in Mexico were made by the defendant manufacturers.
Mexico sued these seven U.S. manufacturers on various tort and state statutory claims, which the district court dismissed as barred by PLCAA. PLCAA is a federal statute that prohibits claims against gun manufacturers in state and federal courts for harms stemming from the criminal or unlawful use of firearms. But PLCAA has various exceptions, and on appeal, the First Circuit held that some of Mexico’s claims fell with PLCAA’s so-called “predicate exception” for actions in which the defendant knowingly violated a state or federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of guns. The court of appeals concluded that Mexico had adequately alleged that the defendants violated federal statutes that prohibit selling guns without a license, exporting guns without a license, and selling to straw purchasers, and therefore could bring their tort claims under this exception.
The defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for review. But in the meantime, six of the seven defendants argued that the district court should dismiss the claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Personal Jurisdiction
In order to hear claims, a court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k), unless the claims are based on federal law, a federal court may typically exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant only if a state court in the forum state could do so. This means satisfying the constitutional requirements that the U.S. Supreme Court has imposed on state courts under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as any further requirements under the state’s long-arm statute.
There are two basic kinds of personal jurisdiction. Under “general jurisdiction,” a court may hear all claims against the defendant, even claims that are unrelated to the forum. But a court may typically exercise general jurisdiction only if the defendant is “at home” in the forum, which for a corporation means where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business. Under “specific jurisdiction,” a court may hear claims against a defendant who is not at home in the forum, but only if those claims “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s contacts with the forum.
Of the seven U.S. gun manufacturers that Mexico sued, only Smith & Wesson is subject to general jurisdiction in Massachusetts because it had its headquarters there. (The company subsequently moved its headquarters to Tennessee.) None of the other six is incorporated in Massachusetts or has its principal place of business there. That left specific jurisdiction as the only possibility.
Because Massachusetts’s long-arm statute imposes requirements that go beyond those of the Fourteenth Amendment, the district court began with that statute. As relevant here, Massachusetts law authorizes personal jurisdiction with respect to “a cause of action in law or equity arising from the [defendant’s] . . . transacting any business in this Commonwealth.” It was not disputed that the six non-Massachusetts defendants transacted business in Massachusetts because they sold guns there. The question was whether Mexico’s claims arose from that business.
Massachusetts’s “arising from” requirement has been interpreted to mean that the transacted business must be the “but for” cause of the alleged harm. The district court held that Mexico failed to make a prima facie showing that this requirement was satisfied because it did not establish “that the guns sold in Massachusetts were the same guns that ultimately caused plaintiff’s injuries.”
For the sake of completeness, the district court also addressed whether the constitutional requirements for specific jurisdiction were met. The Fourteenth Amendment’s limits on specific jurisdiction are not as demanding as those of the Massachusetts long-arm statute, for they permit specific jurisdiction over claims that “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s contact with the forum (emphasis added). In Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the “relate to” prong of this formulation did not require a causal showing.
In Ford, the plaintiffs were residents of the forum states and were injured there, but the products causing their injuries were neither made nor initially sold in those states. The district court found Mexico’s case distinguishable from Ford, however, because Mexico is not a resident of Massachusetts and was not injured there.
The district court reasoned that this case was closer to Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California(2017), which found no specific jurisdiction in California in a suit by non-resident plaintiffs who were not injured in California and had not shown that specific products causing their injuries came from California. The defendant in BMS had sold a large amount of the allegedly defective product in California, just as the six defendants had sold guns in Massachusetts. “At best,” the court concluded, Mexico “has alleged that the type of products sold by the six moving defendants in Massachusetts are the same type of products that caused its injuries in Mexico. That is not a sufficient basis to assert personal jurisdiction.”
The district court went on to hold, alternatively, that the exercise of specific jurisdiction in this case would be unreasonable under Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (1987). “There are no specific Massachusetts statutory claims asserted against any of the six moving defendants; plaintiff is not a Massachusetts citizen; not one of defendants is a Massachusetts citizen; no injury occurred in Massachusetts; and no Massachusetts citizen is alleged to have suffered any injury.” One might question the assertion that none of the defendants is a Massachusetts citizen, for Smith & Wesson was. Asahi’s factor addressing the most effective resolution of the controversy therefor cuts in favor of jurisdiction, since it makes more sense to have similar claims heard in one court than in seven. But, of course, reasonableness alone would not be sufficient to overcome the six defendants’ lack of minimum contacts with Massachusetts.
What Comes Next?
In the end, district court’s decision is likely to splinter Mexico’s claims into multiple suits. Each of the six non-Massachusetts defendants is incorporated in another U.S. state and has its principal place of business either there or in yet another U.S. state. Thus, each of these defendants is subject to general jurisdiction somewhere else in the United States.
Barrett Firearms Manufacturing may be sued in Tennessee, where it is incorporated and has its principal place of business. Beretta U.S.A. may be sued in Maryland, where it is incorporated and has its principal place of business. Century Arms International may be sued in Vermont, where it is incorporated, or in Florida, where it has its principal place of business. Glock may be sued in Georgia, where it is incorporated and has its principal place of business. Sturm, Ruger & Co. may be sued in Delaware, where it is incorporated, or in Connecticut, where it has its principal place of business. And Colt may be sued in Kansas, where it is incorporated, or in Connecticut where it has its principal place of business.
None of these states is in the First Circuit, so that court’s decision that PLCAA does not bar Mexico’s claims will not be precedential in these other cases. But a district court in Arizona has already found the First Circuit’s decision persuasive in a suit against gun distributors. Other courts may well do the same. Of course, the Supreme Court might take up this question in the meantime, but there is currently no circuit split to warrant such review. So, for now, Mexico’s claims will continue in U.S. courts—just spread across more of them.