Venue Transfer and FSIA Circuit Splits
November 17, 2026
Just in time for 1Ls studying for their civ pro finals, the Southern District of New York (SDNY) (Judge Dale Ho) has issued a thoughtful decision denying venue transfer in a dispute between Russia and a Ukrainian bank. JSC Oschadbank v. Russian Federation is a good reminder of how to analyze venue transfer requests under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and § 1406. It also raises an intriguing question about § 1404(a) transfers in light of a circuit split regarding interpretation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).
Background
Oschadbank is a Ukrainian bank that is completely owned by the Ukrainian state. It claims that when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Russia seized over $1 billion in Oschadbank’s assets. Oschadbank obtained an arbitral award against Russia for over $1 billion in damages through a tribunal administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Russia sought to annul the award in French court but lost, resulting in a French judgment that Oschadbank maintains effectively confirms the arbitral award.
Oschadbank then sought to enforce the arbitral award in the United States, filing suit in the U.S. District for the District of Columbia (DDC) and invoking the FSIA’s exception for enforcing arbitral awards (28 U.S. § 1605(a)(6)). It separately filed suit in New York state court, seeking recognition and enforcement of the French judgment under New York’s Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgments Act. It did so because the DC Circuit has interpreted the FSIA’s arbitral award exception as applying only to arbitral awards and not to foreign judgments recognizing arbitral awards, while the Second Circuit has interpreted the exception more broadly as encompassing such foreign judgments.
Russia removed the state court case to the SDNY and then moved to transfer it to the DDC, invoking both 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and § 1406. The SDNY rejected both motions.
How to Analyze Venue Transfer Motions
As a refresher, § 1406 permits transfer of a case to another federal district (or outright dismissal) if venue is improper in the district in which the case is filed. (It provides: “The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”) But even if a case is filed in a district for which venue is proper, § 1404(a) gives federal judges discretion to transfer the case to a more convenient federal forum. (That section provides: “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.”)
When analyzing venue transfer motions (for 1L exams or in real life), the first question is thus whether venue is appropriate in this court. Venue in federal court is typically determined by 28 U.S.C. § 1391, and § 1391(f) specifically addresses venue for actions brought against foreign states. That provision, Russia argued, establishes that venue would only be appropriate in DDC.
But when a case is removed from state to federal court, the general venue statute (§ 1391) is displaced by the venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1441. (In the words of § 1391, it only governs venue “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.”) Section 1441(a) provides that cases removed from state to federal court should be removed “to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” Section 1441(d) makes clear that this venue directive also applies when a foreign state removes an action against it from state to federal court. Judge Ho also noted that § 1391, by its own terms, “govern[s] the venue of all civil actions brought in the district courts of the United States” (emphasis added), which he reasoned did not reach actions brought in state court. The court thus held that venue was proper in the SDNY and rejected Russia’s request to transfer under § 1406 for improper venue.
For venue transfer motions, the second question is whether the case could have been brought in the proposed transferee court—in this case, the DDC. That typically means asking whether venue would have been proper and personal jurisdiction would have been available over the defendant in the proposed transferee court. Could Oschadbank have filed its suit to enforce the French judgment confirming the arbitral award in the DDC? That turned out to be a tricky question.
Should Differences in Circuit Precedent Matter?
Some civ pro professors—myself included—teach Van Dusen v. Barrack (1964) and Ferens v. John Deere Co. (1990), which establish that when federal jurisdiction is based on diversity, a discretionary transfer under § 1404(a) carries with it the state law that the transferring court would have applied. But most courts agree that when jurisdiction is based on a federal question, the transferee court is not expected to apply the circuit precedent of the transferor court and may instead follow its own circuit precedent. Why? Because even though circuits sometimes interpret federal law differently, in theory they are all applying the same federal law.
But what if the difference in circuit court precedent would lead to different conclusions about the existence of both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction? For a suit against a foreign sovereign, subject-matter jurisdiction only exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) if an exception to the FSIA applies—and once (but only once) an exception to the FSIA applies, personal jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign is also authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). If Oschadbank had filed its action seeking recognition of the French judgment in the DDC, the DDC would have been bound by DC Circuit precedent holding that the FSIA’s arbitral award exception did not apply. It thus would have concluded it lacked both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. So, in the words of § 1404(a), was the DDC a district where Oschadbank’s suit “might have been brought”?
Judge Ho held no and that the motion to transfer under § 1404(a) must therefore be denied. I find this to be an intriguing question and can see arguments on both sides. A simpler route might have been for the court to exercise its discretion under § 1404(a) to decline the transfer request as not “in the interest of justice,” whether or not such a transfer would have been theoretically permissible. Either way, the court was right not to transfer the case to its certain death.