Confusion in the Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments

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There are at least three different legal regimes in the United States that govern the recognition of foreign judgments. While the distinctions between these regimes is clear to me—and, I suspect, to many readers of this blog—the same is not necessarily true for many judges and practicing attorneys. In this post, I first discuss a case where there was some confusion as to which of these regimes should be applied. I then review the differences between them for the benefit of readers who may not be well versed in this area of the law.

Chu v. Nanna

William Nanna and Sophia Chu were married in Japan in 2011. In the years that followed, they had three children together. In 2020, Chu filed for divorce in Japan. A Japanese court granted the divorce in 2021. In its decree, the court stated that:

Nanna was obligated to pay (1) a lump sum of $200,000 to Chu by September 15, 2022; (2) $2,000 each month as “post-divorce living support” until May 31, 2025, or until Nanna retired from the military; (3) $30,000 of attorney fees incurred by Chu in Texas; and (4) monthly child support.

Nanna allegedly failed to pay the $200,000 lump sum, the $30,000 in attorney fees, and the monthly child support in the years that followed.

In 2024, Chu attempted to register the Japanese divorce judgment in state court in Missouri pursuant to the Missouri Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA). Nanna moved to dismiss on the grounds that (1) Chu had failed to file a properly verified petition, and (2) the Japanese divorce decree was not a “foreign judgment” covered by the UEFJA. The trial court denied his motion and Nanna took an interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals in Missouri reversed the trial court and ordered the case dismissed because Chu’s petition did not include a copy of the judgment to be registered. This decision was clearly correct, as Chu conceded on appeal that her petition had omitted information mandated by statute.

In 2025, Chu attempted to register the Japanese divorce judgment in state court in Illinois pursuant to the Illinois Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. Nanna moved (again) to dismiss. The trial court (again) denied the motion. The court of appeals (again) overruled the trial court and entered judgment for Nanna. This time around, the court of appeals based its decision on the fact that the Japanese judgment was not a “foreign judgment” covered by the UEFJA. This decision was also clearly correct, as the only judgments covered by the UEFJA are those rendered by U.S. states and U.S. territories. The Act does not apply to judgments from foreign countries like Japan.

This factual recitation presents some interesting questions. Why did the trial court in Missouri deny Nanna’s motion to dismiss when Chu’s petition plainly did not satisfy the statutory requirements for registration? Why did Chu’s attorney invoke the UEFJA in Illinois even after Nanna pointed out (in the Missouri proceedings) that it did not apply to Japanese divorce judgments? And why did the trial court in Illinois deny Nanna’s motion to dismiss when the UEFJA was so plainly inapplicable? None of these questions lend themselves to easy answers. The only certainty is that Sophia Chu is no better off today than she was when her legal odyssey began.

Regimes for Recognizing Foreign Judgments

In light of the confusion exhibited by various actors in the case discussed above, it is useful to review three distinct legal regimes that govern the recognition of foreign judgments in the United States. The first applies to sister-state judgments. The second applies to certain foreign country money judgments. The third applies to most other foreign country judgments.

The recognition of sister-state judgments is governed by the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. The UEFJA, currently in force in every state except California and Vermont, applies to “any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state.” Foreign country judgments are not rendered by U.S. courts and are not entitled to full faith and credit. Accordingly, the Japanese judgment held by Chu is not covered by the UEFJA.

The recognition of many foreign-country money judgments is governed by the 2005 Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgments Recognition Act. The UFCMJRA, currently in force in twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia, applies to a foreign-country money judgment so long as it is not (1) a judgment for taxes, (2) a fine or penalty, or (3) a judgment rendered in connection with domestic relations, including judgments relating to divorce, support, or maintenance. (The UFCMJRA’s substantially similar predecessor is still in force in nine additional states.) The Japanese judgment at issue in Chu v. Nanna touches on family relations. Accordingly, it is not covered by the UFCMJRA.

The recognition of a foreign-country judgment not subject to the UFCMJRA is generally governed by common-law principles of comity. Bill Dodge recently authored a terrific post surveying this body of law. He argued that many states look to one specific paragraph in Hilton v. Guyot (1895) for guidance as to the meaning of comity in this context. That passage states that a foreign judgment should be recognized if:

there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it is sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment.

This is the legal test that the state courts in Missouri and/or Illinois will eventually apply to determine whether the Japanese divorce judgment should be recognized in Chu v. Nanna, though there is a possibly that these courts will look to still another legal regime (the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act) to determine if the portion of the judgment relating to the payment of child support should be recognized. I’ll provide an update should yet another lawsuit be filed in this case. The third time just might be the charm.