Safari Choice-of-Law Clauses

Tyler Coyle, MD, reads the liability waiver.

Photo by John Coyle

In June 2026, I went on a safari in Tanzania with my family. We went on a hot air balloon ride over the Serengeti, visited a Masai village, and saw all of the Big Five. Before we embarked on these adventures, we were asked to sign an Assumption of Risk, Waiver of Liability, and Indemnification Agreement (“Agreement”) drafted by Tauck, Inc., the company that organized the tour. This agreement was circulated to us after we had arrived in Tanzania but before we boarded our Land Cruiser.

As I was reading over the Agreement, a number of questions sprung to mind. Is asking someone to sign a liability waiver after they have spent thousands of dollars to travel to a far-off country procedurally unconscionable? What would happen if I refused to sign? The question that loomed over all the others, however, was one that doubtless would have occurred to just about anyone. Why on earth did Tauck select Connecticut law to govern its liability waiver?

In this post, I seek to answer this final—and most important—question. I first survey the relevant terms of the Agreement. I then explain why Connecticut law represents a uniquely bad choice of law given the purpose of this document. I next offer some possible explanations as to why it was chosen. Finally, I discuss how some unusual language in the choice-of-law clause may give Tauck a means of avoiding the very law it has chosen… but at the cost of generating considerably more uncertainty as to the governing law.

The Agreement

The Agreement is a page and a half long. You can read it in its entirety here. In this post, I want to focus on two provisions. The first is the liability waiver, which reads as follows:

I hereby waive and release any and all claims, causes of action and liabilities that I may have presently or in the future against Tauck and the other Releasees for any and all Damages that I may incur as a result of or arising out of my participation in the Activities due to any cause whatsoever, including, but not limited to, the negligence of the owners, employees, officers or agents of the Activity Providers and other suppliers, the negligence of Activity participants, and the negligence of others (including Tauck and the other Releasees).

The term “Activities” is defined to include Hot Air Ballooning, Safari, and associated activities in connection with the foregoing.

The second provision I want to focus on is the choice-of-law clause. It provides:

I agree that . . . unless otherwise waived in writing by Tauck, this agreement is governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut, without giving effect to the conflict of laws principles thereof.

When I saw this choice-of-law clause, I found myself thinking back to the Contracts class that I taught in the fall of 2025. I was searching for a case to teach my students about the public policy exception. After considering several different options, I assigned a 2005 case by the Connecticut Supreme Court: Hanks v. Powder Ridge. The facts and holding of that very salient case are described below.

Hanks v. Powder Ridge

The defendants in Hanks v. Powder Ridge operated a snowtubing facility in Middlefield, Connecticut. On February 16, 2003, the plaintiff brought his children to Powder Ridge to go snowtubing. To access the facility, all patrons were required to sign a ‘‘Waiver, Defense, Indemnity and Hold Harmless Agreement, and Release of Liability.’’ The plaintiff read and signed the agreement on behalf of himself and his children. While snowtubing, the plaintiff’s right foot became caught between his snowtube and the man-made bank of the snowtubing run. This injury ultimately required multiple surgeries.

The plaintiff sued Powder Ridge for negligence in Connecticut state court. Powder Ridge argued that the agreement signed by the plaintiff relieved it of liability as a matter of law even if the accident was due to the negligence of the defendant. The Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed. Specifically, it held that “enforcement of a well drafted exculpatory agreement purporting to release a snowtube operator from prospective liability for personal injuries sustained as a result of the operator’s negligent conduct violates public policy.” In support of this conclusion, the court made the following observation:

If the defendants were permitted to obtain broad waivers of their liability, an important incentive for ski areas to manage risk would be removed, with the public bearing the cost of the resulting injuries. . . . It is illogical, in these circumstances, to undermine the public policy underlying business invitee law and allow skiers to bear risks they have no ability or right to control.

The court also went on to point out the unfairness in the timing of when the plaintiffs were asked to sign the release:

[T]he defendants did not inform prospective snowtubers prior to their arrival at Powder Ridge that they would have to waive important common-law rights as a condition of participation. Thus, the plaintiff, who traveled to Powder Ridge in anticipation of snowtubing that day, was faced with the dilemma of either signing the defendants’ proffered waiver of prospective liability or forgoing completely the opportunity to snowtube at Powder Ridge. Under the present factual circumstances, it would ignore reality to conclude that the plaintiff wielded the same bargaining power as the defendants.

Finally, the court acknowledged—in response to a vigorous dissent—that only a minority of jurisdictions in the United States refuse to enforce liability waivers. Indeed, it specifically conceded that “most states uphold adhesion contracts releasing recreational operators from prospective liability for personal injuries caused by their own negligent conduct.” Nevertheless, the court stuck to its guns: “Put simply, we disagree with these decisions for the reasons already explained in this opinion.”

Why Connecticut?

The experience of going on a safari in Tanzania is obviously different from the experience of going snowtubing in Connecticut. It is not, however, so wildly different to avoid the logic of the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in Hanks v. Powder Ridge. If I had been injured during my safari adventure, and if I had brought a personal injury suit against Tauck, then my claims would have been governed by the laws of Connecticut by virtue of the Connecticut choice-of-law clause in the Agreement. It is very likely, however, that the waiver would have been struck down as violative of Connecticut public policy, which would defeat the purpose of having me sign the waiver in the first place.

Why then did Tauck choose the law of Connecticut to govern its waiver? I suspect that it did so because its lawyers know it well. Tauck was founded in 1925 to provide tours of the Northeastern United States. The company has been incorporated in Connecticut since at least 1972. Its headquarters are now—and have long been—located in Wilton, Connecticut. It is common for companies to choose the laws of the state where they are headquartered and/or incorporated to govern their agreements. They do this because they believe that it will provide them with a “home court” advantage should a dispute lead to litigation. In light of all of this, the company’s choice of Connecticut law to govern its waivers is not surprising.

The choice of Connecticut law is, however, a terrible choice in this context because (1) the purpose of the waiver is to protect Tauck from liability, and (2) there is a very strong argument that the waiver is invalid under the laws of Connecticut. To be sure, it does not appear that Tauck has ever been sued in Connecticut for personal injuries suffered by one of its patrons on a tour. (If they have, my quick Westlaw search did not uncover the case.) If such a case were to be brought, however, the Connecticut choice-of-law clause may well deep-six a defense that would be viable under the laws of the majority of U.S. states that enforce liability waivers.

A Potential Loophole

Although the clause is a disaster in a number of respects, it does contain a possible loophole. It states: “I agree that . . . unless otherwise waived in writing by Tauck, this agreement is governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut, without giving effect to the conflict of laws principles thereof.” The italicized language suggests that Tauck can, in effect, avoid its own choice-of-law clause by preparing a written waiver and submitting it to the court. At that point, the choice-of-law clause would vanish from the contract and the court would have to perform a choice-of-law analysis to determine the governing law.

Although this course of action would negate the choice-of-law clause, it is still fraught with uncertainty. It is possible that the court would conclude that the contract was governed by Connecticut law even after performing a choice-of-law analysis. It is also possible that the court would conclude that the waiver is governed by the law of the jurisdiction where it was signed—Tanzania—and apply the law of that jurisdiction. It is unclear that the waiver would be enforceable under Tanzanian law. If Tauck uses the same release in the many different countries where it organizes tours, moreover, then the enforceability of the waiver may vary depending on where the injury occurs. This outcome seems undesirable in light of the ostensible goal of choice-of-law clauses, i.e. to provide stability and predictability with respect to the governing law.

Conclusion

The simplest way forward, in my view, would be for Tauck to choose the law of a U.S. jurisdiction that follows the majority rule enforcing these waivers. I am not at all confident, however, that this will happen any time soon. History suggests that this sort of contract language can be stubbornly sticky and resistant to change… even after an enterprising blogger offers free legal advice to a company (Microsoft, for example) with lots of lawyers and powerful incentives to make the change.