Civil Contempt Orders Against Non-Parties in Parallel Proceedings

Among the challenges U.S. courts face in managing parallel litigation is enforcing any anti-suit injunctions they might order. In this regard, one of the most important enforcement tools they have at their disposal is the power to impose contempt sanctions in response to violations of their orders. The authority of a court to hold the parties before it in contempt is clear. Contempt orders issued against non-parties, however, may present jurisdictional obstacles. If those obstacles prevent a court from enforcing an anti-suit injunction against non-parties who actively assist in its violation, a compliance gap can result.

A recent case in the Southern District of New York, Fox Corp. v. Media Deportes Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V., highlights the relevant issues. In that case, Judge Jed S. Rakoff held a non-party in contempt, finding that it had aided and abetted the violation of an anti-suit injunction relating to parallel litigation in Mexico. This post reviews that order, using it to highlight (1) the state of the law on personal jurisdiction over non-party contemnors and (2) the factors that should guide the courts in litigation involving anti-suit injunctions.

Background: The Scope of the Contempt Power

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders are binding not only on the parties but also—as long as they receive actual notice—on the parties’ officers and agents, along with “other persons who are in active concert or participation” with them or the parties. This expansion in the scope of such orders responds to the reality that judicial orders would be worth little if parties could get around them by enlisting aiders and abettors in their violation.

In 1985, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a key decision on the authority of courts to enter contempt orders against non-resident non-parties. In Waffenschmidt v. MacKay, it held two non-resident non-parties in contempt for assisting a defendant in dissipating assets in violation of its earlier order. The opinion began with the observation that a court may hold an enjoined party in contempt for violation of its order regardless of the location of that violation. It then addressed jurisdiction over non-party contemnors, holding that a court may properly assert jurisdiction over an entity that aids and abets a party’s violation of an order even in the absence of other forum contacts.

The court offered two alternative rationales for that conclusion. The first rested on the inherent power of courts to enforce their own decrees. As noted, injunctions bind not only the parties but also non-parties who act in concert with them. If those injunctions could be enforced only against non-parties residing within the forum, the court reasoned, they could be easily thwarted. It concluded that since the injunctive authority of a federal court extends throughout U.S. territory, so too must the court’s “concomitant power … to reach out to nonparties who knowingly violate its orders.”

The second rationale rested on “traditional in personam jurisdiction” analysis. The court stated that the non-parties had “purposefully engaged in activity outside [the forum] that would have the foreseeable and intended result of dissipating assets subject to marshalling [there].” In light of the substantial effect of their actions on the administration of justice, it concluded, the exercise of personal jurisdiction did not violate due process even though the non-parties had no other contacts with the forum.

Subsequent cases have grappled with the problem of jurisdiction over non-party aiders and abettors under this framework. The SDNY’s opinion in the Fox case illustrates its application in the context of anti-suit injunctions.

Fox Corp. v. Media Deportes Mexico

This case is part of an ongoing dispute playing out in the United States and Mexico regarding the rights to broadcast sporting events in Mexico under the Fox Sports brand. As part of a larger transaction, in 2021 an affiliate of the Fox Corporation entered into a licensing agreement assigning rights to broadcast events under certain Fox trademarks to Media Deportes Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V. (MDM). That licensing agreement included a forum selection clause identifying New York as the exclusive site for the litigation of claims arising under the license.

A dispute arose as to whether the license was exclusive or non-exclusive. In March of 2025, MDM sought relief in the Superior Court of Justice of Mexico City, obtaining an injunction barring Fox from continuing to use its trademarks in Mexico. Fox responded by commencing litigation against MDM in the Southern District of New York (SDNY), alleging that MDM’s action constituted a breach of the licensing agreement and the exclusive forum selection clause it included.

On August 14, 2025, Judge Rakoff issued a temporary restraining order against MDM “and anyone acting in concert with it.” The TRO enjoined certain uses of Fox trademarks, as well as the pursuit of any legal action in Mexico, including efforts to enforce the injunction issued by the Mexican court. In contravention of the TRO, MDM filed a new motion in the Mexican court seeking an extension of that court’s own injunction. Fox responded by filing an emergency motion in the SDNY. It sought contempt sanctions not only against MDM, but also against a number of other entities, including Mexico Sports Distribution LLC (MSD), a Delaware company that together with MDM operated Fox Sports Mexico. (MSD had joined MDM in both the initial proceedings in the Mexican court and the subsequent proceedings there following the SDNY’s TRO.)

Judge Rakoff entered the requested contempt order on August 29, finding that MDM and MSD had violated the TRO by moving for another injunction in Mexico and ordering them to pay a fine of $200,000 per day. MSD subsequently moved to set aside the contempt order against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. Judge Rakoff entered an order on September 19 denying that motion, and on September 30 issued an opinion explaining his reasoning.

That opinion identified three independent bases for exercising personal jurisdiction over MSD. First, it concluded that MSD was a “joint venturer” with MDM “in the business known as Fox Sports Mexico.” As such, they were “each the principal and each the agent of the other.” That meant that MDM’s submission to the exclusive jurisdiction of courts in New York also bound MSD. In addition, they were “substantially intertwined to the point of being legally identifiable” with each other.

Second, Judge Rakoff held that MSD’s actions justified the exercise of jurisdiction on an aiding and abetting theory. This basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-party contemnor rests on the fact that an aider and abettor is not acting independently of the enjoined party. It requires the court to establish that the enjoined party committed contempt, and that the actions of the non-party were taken to benefit or assist the party rather than for some independent purpose. It does not appear to require the satisfaction of “the usual tests for personal jurisdiction”—although Judge Rakoff dropped a footnote referring to the “not entirely pellucid state of the law” on this matter, inviting the Second Circuit to clarify. In this case, he concluded, the conditions for exercising aiding and abetting jurisdiction over MSD were met.

Third, he found that MSD’s actions justified the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the traditional test for specific jurisdiction. Its actions were “designed to have purpose and effect in the forum” in that they were aimed at circumventing the order of the court there; moreover, exercising jurisdiction would be substantively reasonable. In reaching the latter conclusion, Judge Rakoff cited the strong interest of both New York and the plaintiffs in enforcing the forum selection clause in favor of New York courts. He also noted the judicial system’s “exceedingly strong interest in ensuring that court orders are carried out rather than violated.”

Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Non-parties for Contempt

MSD is a Delaware corporation. Had it been a foreign company, that would have raised some additional due process concerns. First, some courts have questioned whether the “aiding and abetting” theory provides an independent basis for personal jurisdiction over foreign non-parties, since it is linked to the scope of the federal courts’ injunctive authority within the territory of the United States. Second, the traditional test for exercising specific jurisdiction might operate differently in that context. Even if aiding and abetting the violation of a judicial order is sufficient to satisfy the minimum-contacts threshold for jurisdiction in the forum, a court must still consider the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction in the particular case. One might argue that the reasonableness factors would play out differently in cases involving foreign non-parties.

A number of courts have nevertheless indicated that the nationality of a non-party should not change the analysis of personal jurisdiction over contemnors. For example, in Philips Medical Systems (Cleveland), Inc. v. Buan, issued the same week as the SDNY opinion, the Northern District of Illinois approved the exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign non-parties—officers of the defendant corporation—in a cross-border trade secrets dispute. It characterized previous cases as holding that “nonparties’ knowing actions in concert with the defendant to violate the district court’s orders were alone sufficient to establish jurisdiction and satisfy due process,” and that the foreign citizenship of the non-parties “does not materially alter the calculus.”

To the extent that there is heightened concern with the imposition of contempt orders against foreign non-parties, it generally stems from a different source: the problem of foreign state compulsion. It is sometimes the case that a non-party’s compliance with the order of a U.S. court would require it to violate local law. An entity subjected to such conflicting demands can assert foreign compulsion as a defense on the merits—but courts can and should also address this problem at the reasonableness step when determining personal jurisdiction over a contemnor. In one representative case, Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. McLaughlin, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that personal jurisdiction was lacking over a non-party bank that had released a defendant’s funds in alleged violation of a U.S. court order, but as required by local law.

It is worth highlighting, though, that foreign compulsion typically involves the collision between a U.S. court’s order and some generally applicable foreign law, such as a bank secrecy law. Compliance with an anti-suit injunction, as in Fox Corp. v. MDM, would not ordinarily subject a non-party to conflicting demands, since the initiation or pursuit of local litigation is not likely to be required by local law. Further, the issuance of an anti-anti-suit injunction by a foreign court should not affect the reasonableness of asserting personal jurisdiction over a non-party who moves for such an order.